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Journalists and Terrorism:
Captives of the Libertarian Tradition
WALTER B. JAEHNIG*
The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was the precursor of the in-
dustrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth. In consequence, man has suffered
the impact of an enormously enlarged control of physical energies without any cor-
responding ability to control himself and his own affairs. . . . Man, a child in
understanding of himself, has placed in his hands physical tools of incalculable power.
He plays with them like a child, and whether they work harm or good is largely a mat-
ter of accident. The instrumentality becomes a master and works fatally as if possessed
of a will of its own-not because it has a will but because man has not.
John Dewey
THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS
George Martz, a Marion County deputy prosecutor, went on television on
Thursday, Feb. 10, 1977, to broadcast an offer to kidnapper Anthony Kirit-
sis. Martz said he could guarantee Kiritsis complete immunity from state pro-
secution if Kiritsis would release his hostage, Indianapolis mortgage company
executive Richard Hall. Martz added that he understood that immunity from
federal prosecution was "in the making."
Martz's offer was watched with interest, particularly in Indianapolis
newsrooms. A reporter at the Associated Press bureau called the U.S. At-
torney for Southern Indiana, seeking confirmation of Martz's hint that a
federal immunity might be available. The federal attorney said, for the
record, that immunity was not forthcoming; the "Justice Department won't
bargain with gunmen." Another reporter in the AP's Washington bureau ob-
tained the same response from officials at the Justice Department. If Martz's
statement on the federal immunity was not true, AP staffers reasoned, could
it be-as many suspected-that the promise not to prosecute Kiritsis under
state laws was not genuine as well?
"Now we had a severe conscience qualm," said Darrell Christian, an AP
newsman. "What if we ran the story (that the immunity offer might be a
ruse), Kiritsis hears it on TV and blows Hall's head off?"'
Richard Hall had been a hostage for some sixty hours when newsmen
quietly were informed that he might be released shortly. Kiritsis wanted to
*Assistant Professor, School of Journalism, Indiana University.
'For a description of the Associated Press's coverage of the Kiritsis case and its handling of
the immunity offer, see a videotape recording of a panel discussion on the Kiritsis kidnapping
held at the Indiana University School of Journalism on Feb. 27, 1977 [hereinafter cited as the
Bloomington panel] (on deposit at the Foellinger Learning Laboratory, Indiana University School
of Journalism).
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
make a statement, they were told, so cameras were readied in a lounge of the
apartment block where the siege was taking place. Kiritsis appeared, but in-
stead of a post-surrender news conference, at 10:27 p.m. viewers of "The
Streets of San Francisco" (ABC), "The People's Choice Awards" (CBS) or
"Seventh Avenue" (NBC) were startled to see on their television screens the
image of an agitated Anthony Kiritsis-not alone, but with Hall still wired to
the end of his sawed-off shotgun. Kiritsis launched an extended harangue, lit-
tered with obscenities, in his moment before the cameras: "I'm the one they
call a kidnapper. I'm a goddamn national hero and don't you forget it .... I
hope this gun doesn't go off-I'm having too much fun . . ."-a performance
that one newsman later referred to as "over a half hour of live, obscene hor-
ror."
As the melodrama unfolded, questions grew in the minds of television
news executives. How long should the broadcast continue? Who is controlling
this broadcast: Tony Kiritsis or the news staffs of the stations? And what if he
pulls the trigger-and splashes blood across every living room in central In-
diana?2
VIOLENCE, TERROR AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS
Evidence from recent events makes it a truism to say that terrorism,
hostage-taking and other violent incidents raise confounding ethical dilemmas
for the news media. Those who use violence, or threats of violence, to attain
their objectives have recognized that the surest guarantee of saturation news
coverage lies in a shocking appeal to traditional news values, making full use
of the news industry's attraction to the dramatic, conflict-laden, and tragic or
potentially tragic event. News judgments regarding the coverage of terrorism
are made swiftly if not hastily, often with less than the full cooperation of
police authorities, usually under the pressure of commercial competi-
tion- and to outsiders at least, with apparent lack of concern for the conse-
quences of these decisions. After the fact, and in rebuttal to criticisms of the
news media's morality (or lack thereof), media representatives seek to justify
these judgments with familiar references to hoary propositions regarding to
the essential role of an independent press in a free society, the public's right
to know, and the Founding Fathers' wisdom in recognizing the self-righting
nature of Truth.
But the ethical questions remain, with an especial urgency for broadcast
journalists because of the recent development of electronic newsgathering
equipment. This equipment gives network and local station news teams the
capability of producing nearly instantaneous broadcasts of live events occurr-
ing outside the studio. But it introduces a speculative element as well, for in-
2Trounstine, Indiana Kidnapper Directs Live Newscasts with Shotgun, MORE, June, 1977,
at 14-16.
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stantaneous broadcasting largely eliminates the journalistic editing function.
Thus in addition to opening new reporting possibilities, the electronic equip-
ment has raised important new questions of an ethical nature: What are the
risks of live reporting and when are they justified? Which news events are not
appropriate for live coverage? How significant must a news story be to war-
rant interruption of a regularly scheduled program?s
The significance of these questions was demonstrated to Chicago broad-
casters in March 1977 when Hanafi Muslim gunmen occupied three buildings
in Washington, D.C., killed a student reporter and took more than 130
hostages. The unfolding of this drama was watched anxiously a thousand
miles away in the Chicago newsroom of the Columbia Broadcasting System.
How could the story be covered at that distance, relating it to viewers in the
highly competitive Chicago television market? A telephone caller to CBS
News identified himself as-an Hanafi Muslim and provided the address of the
sect's Chicago temple. Though the major 6 p.m. newscast was only minutes
away, a reporter and electronic camera crew were dispatched. They found at
the address a rundown house guarded by three "menacing" men who allowed
only the reporter-with camera-to enter. Inside, the reporter was con-
fronted by a young man who said that he had a statement to make. Who was
this man? Did he really have a connection with the Hanafis? Was it worth the
risk to put his statement, whatever it might contain, on the 6 o'clock news?
Despite the fact that "no one knew who he was, no one knew what he
would say . . ." CBS News put the self-professed Hanafi on the air. "The
young man, who could have been Santa Claus for all the reporter knew, at
two minutes after 6, was addressing nearly two million people," recalled
Robert Faw, a CBS News reporter. 4 As it turned out, he had much to say,
but it did not pertain to the siege in Washington.
But it can be said that CBS News responded as journalism's libertarian
traditions suggest that it must: it reported the news (or what was perceived to
be the news) without fear or regard for its consequences. The same justifica-
tion applies to the news organizations reporting the Kiritsis melodrama and
facing the ethical dilemmas described at the beginning of this article. The
Associated Press elected to move the story questioning the availability of im-
munity from prosecution for Anthony Kiritsis. However, before the story was
broadcast or published, Kiritsis had released his hostage, and learned for
3B.D. Johnson, The Effect of Electronic News Gathering on Television News in Min-
neapolis/Saint Paul from December 1974 through April 1976, (August, 1977) (on file at the In-
diana University School of Journalism Library).
4Address to Indiana University conference, West Germany and the United States: A
Systems Comparison Analysis (April. 1977) (videotape on deposit at Foellinger Learning Library,
Indiana University School of Journalism). Faw concluded: "And at that point the new technology
had arisen to its highest form, some would argue .... But there's absolutely no journalism that
takes place in a situation like that. The reporter becomes a game show host, just occasionally
putting questions in to keep it moving. My point is that if that's what we've come to, perhaps
we're better off without the new technology."
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himself that the promise of immunity was not genuine 5 And Kiritsis did not,
of course, murder Richard Hall on prime time television-to the everlasting
relief of news executives of the two Indianapolis stations that broadcast the
entire event live. But their decisions are being debated still within the news
industry. One station, WTHR-TV, pulled out after ten minutes of Kiritsis's
diatribe; in the words of its news anchorman, Paul Udell, "Enough is
enough." Mike Ahern, anchorman of a station (WISH-TV) that stayed with
the so-called news conference, later defended his station's decision to continue
coverage by claiming that viewers had been following the story for three days
and the station could not "leave the audience hanging at the moment of
truth."
6
The terrorist phenomenon is, in a large sense, a particular burden of an
open, democratic community. As a commentator on terrorism noted, terrorist
appeals can be successful only against ineffective totalitarian regimes or in
liberal societies that value free expression, vigorous and independent vehicles
of communication, and a responsive, informed public. 7 However, our open
society also attempts to protect itself, and the recent wave of violent incidents
has stimulated public criticism of the news media's symbiotic relationships
with terrorists and others who violate society's standards. This inquiry into
journalism's moral condition has in turn inspired a reconsideration of some of
the industry's traditions and shibboleths. A series of discussions at professional
meetings on "terrorism and the media" and many articles on the subject in
popular magazines and trade publications have concentrated upon media
responsibilities and the possibility of applying voluntary restraints.
Largely absent from this debate, however, has been a consideration of
the basis of journalism's traditional moral posture. At its root, the issue of
terrorism coverage goes beyond questions regarding the propriety or im-
propriety of publishing specific pieces of information or a particular news
story, and focuses instead upon the philosophical rationale for these decisions.
If terrorism and public violence constitute attacks upon the liberal communi-
ty and its values, with whom are journalists and their news organizations
allied? Can the news media assume adversarial roles in relation to public
authority when the social order, its tenets and values are endangered? How
5Perhaps it is fortunate that Kiritsis surrendered before the story reached him through the
news media. Dr. Dwight Schuster, a neuropsychiatrist who advised police authorities during the
incident, said under cross-examination in the preliminary hearings of the Kiritsis case:
Question: Now what would have been the effect on the defendant in your opinion
if you had told him or if he had been told that the State did not intend to honor his
promise of immunity? Would that have prompted another crisis?
Schuster: I believe it certainly would have brought forth quite an outburst.
Question: So any person who knew this was a rude (ruse) would be playing with
fire, if he disclosed it, wouldn't he?
Schuster: Certainly a risk.
Transcript of preliminary hearing, State v. Kiritsis, CR77-44A, at 00092.
GTrounstine, supra note 2, at 15.
'Laqueur, The Futility of Terrorism, HARPEWS MAGAZINE. March, 1976, at 99, 103.
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can the public's right to know be fulfilled when the publication of specific
material could cause direct harm to members of the public or support for its
enemies? These questions, concerned as they are with definitions of jour-
nalism's role and purpose, require ethical answers. But what the news media's
response to terrorism demonstrates instead is the moral poverty of
journalism's libertarian tradition.
THE INDICTMENT OF THE NEWS MEDIA-CRITICISM OF THE MEDIA'S
COVERAGE OF TERRORISM
"American TV has become patsy, promoter and paymaster for political
terrorists - their preferred vehicle of communication," wrote Patrick
Buchanan 8 following the Hanafi incident. Most critics, both outside and
within the news industry, have been more temperate. They share, however,
Buchanan's concern for the ease with which terrorists and impulsive in-
dividuals obtain publicity and a national or international platform through
the news media's newsgathering efforts. Public authorities in particular ques-
tion the legitimacy of reporting volatile situations instantaneously and
newsgathering practices that make participants of newsmen in these situa-
tions. Others object to competitive practices of news organizations which, they
argue, over-emphasize the sensational aspects of terrorist incidents and make
living-room entertainment of public violence. 9
Penetrating questions regarding journalism's relationships with terrorists
and the community underlie this indictment of media behavior. But on a
practical level the weight of this criticism should not be overstated. Terrorist
incidents in the United States have not been as focused politically as those in
Europe, nor have their outcomes been as frightening.10 No innocent victims,
hostage-takers or terrorists are known to have died as a direct result of actions
by the American journalists. Members of the public themselves appear divid-
ed with regard to the appropriate coverage of terrorism. While sixty-four per-
cent of the persons surveyed by the Gallup organization weeks after the
Hanafi incident said they believed detailed news coverage of terrorism en-
courages others to commit similar crimes, they were evenly split between
those who thought the news media over-emphasized terrorism coverage and
those who thought this coverage was necessary to keep the public fully in-
formed." For these and other reasons, the prescriptive statements accompa-
nying media criticism have been limited in scope and concerned more with
'TV GUIDE, March 26, 1977, at A-5.
9See note 29 infra and text accompanying.
'
0
DEP'r OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION. NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS. DISORDERS AND TERRORISM: REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON DISORDERS AND TERRORISM 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE].
"Gallup, Citizens split over coverage of terrorists, Louisville Courier-Journal, April 28,
1977, §A, at 8. col. 1.
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media morality than legal solutions, such as restrictions of the press's first
amendment privilege. 12 For example, the federal Task Force on Disorders
and Terrorism-composed mainly of police and government of-
ficials- concluded that a positive approach toward the news media might be
the most productive in the long term:
A free and responsible news media is a most effective educative device
and an indispensable bulwark against oppression. These potentials for good
should be positively recognized by the civil authority; it should modify its
policies sensibly and adapt its institutions and procedures to working with the
media in the public interest.13
However, police officials and their expert advisers who have had practical
experience in dealing with terrorism question whether journalists are concern-
ed with the public interest. To some, journalists are accomplices of terrorists.
"Terrorism is precisely the kind of thing the media crave. The mass media
and terrorism are made for each other-if they didn't exist independently,
they would have to invent each other."' 4 This relationship is based not upon
a similarity in objectives, but upon the terrorists' realization that their actions
produce "good" news stories. "The media act as a selective magnifying glass:
terrorism always exerts a strange fascination, especially from a safe distance.
It has all the ingredients of a good story-mystery, quick action, tension,
drama. It seems natural, therefore, that the media should give terrorism inor-
dinate publicity.""5
Critics of reporters' symbiotic relationship with terrorists suggest that
journalists should apply better judgment in evaluating the way they are
manipulated by terrorists and hostage-takers, as well as in evaluating the
long-term significance of terrorism itself. Historian Walter Laqueur, for ex-
ample, argues that when viewed from an historical perspective, political ter-
rorism actually is declining around the world, but the public has come to
believe that "terrorism is one of the crucial problems facing mankind."' 6
Saturation news treatment and editorial misjudgments inflate the significance
of the issue in the public mind: "Terrorists and newspapermen share the
naive assumption that those whose names make the headlines have power,
1
2 A well-publicized exception to this was the statement by Andrew Young, U.S. Am-
bassador to the United Nations, to the effect that the U.S. Supreme Court should "clarify" the
meaning of the First Amendment "in light of the power of the mass media." N.Y. Times, March
15, 1977, at 16, col. 4. Later, when asked by a reporter for a news industry trade publication to
explain his remark, Young said: "We have got to hold the visual press responsible and the press
must hold itself responsible .... Now the media is [sic] a business and it needs regulation to pre-
vent it from taking advantage of the weaknesses of the American public. Coverage of the Hanarl
incident reached an incredible low in journalism." Barnes, Young assails tv's coverage of in-
cidents, EDITOR & PUBLISHER. April 9, 1977, at 15.
13Standard 4.10, in REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE. supra note 10, at 65.
14Haldane, Interview with Dr. Frederick Hacker, PENTHOUSE. November, 1977, at 137, 141.
"
5Laqueur, The Continuing Failure of Terrorism, HARPER'S Novermber, 1976, at 70.
164d. at 69.
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that getting one's name on the front page is a major political achievement.
This assumption typifies the prevailing muddled thinking on the subject of
terrorism. 117 Some newspapermen agree that more discerning editorial
judgments are needed; as Stephen Rosenfeld, an editorial writer for the
Washington Post, wrote: "So if the purpose of terror is to send a message, we
messengers should consider not sending it. Instead of mindless collaboration
with terrorists, we should become mindful of the critical relationship of our
purpose and theirs."18
Further, police officials claim that the stampede of the journalistic herd
to interview terrorists reinforces the terrorists' sense of power and accomplish-
ment.19 During the Washington siege, the Hanafi leader, Hamaas Abdul
Khaalis, reportedly told his hostages that "Everybody in the world is trying to
talk to me," as newsmen telephoned from England, France, African coun-
tries, and Australia, as well as from many American cities.20 Fifteen calls
came from newspapers and radio and television stations in Australia alone
during the first night of the siege. 21 Later Khaalis became more
discriminating: ". . . he picked very carefully the newsmen and the news
media he spoke to. For example, he turned down one request for a live radio
interview after he found out that the station, somewhere in Texas, only had
20,000 watts. 'You are not worth talking to,' Khaalis told the reporter, 'I
don't talk to radio with less than 50,000 watts.' ",22
Implicit in many criticisms of media performance is the suggestion that
terrorism and violence are contagious: that one highly publicized incident will
generate others. While no reliable data exist to confirm or deny the con-
tagion hypothesis, some journalists concede that the idea seems plausible.
"When one hostage taker gets his picture on the evening news, we can just
about predict the epidemic that follows. Some other sick soul grabs his hand
gun and takes a hostage, too." 23 Communications researcher George Gerbner
asserts that the contagion factor has been misunderstood: "The most per-
"'Laqueur, supra note 7, at 99.
I"REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 39.
'
5 Speech by Patrick Murphy, president of the Police Foundation, printed in FIELD ENTER-
PRISES, THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM 11 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as THE MEDIA AND TER-
RORISM]. It should, however, be noted that other experts on terrorism disagree with Murphy's
point. Marvin Leibstone, senior analyst for Science Applications, Inc., of Washington, D.C.,
argues that media attention fulfills terrorists' need "for achievement and power. They begin to
feel good about themselves and much of their hostility floats away. However, if terrorists are
denied media coverage, their hostility may be directed toward their hostages." Leibstone, Rules
of terrorism for the victim, terrorist and media, Louisville Courier-Journal, April 17, 1977, §D,
at 3, col. 1.20Speech by D. Hubbard, Convention of the Radio Television News Directors Association
(1977) [hereinafter the recording is referred to as the RTNDA workshop recording] (audio tape is
on deposit in the Foellinger Learning Laboratory, Indiana University School of Journalism).
2 Id.
22Speech by Charles Fenyvasi, editor, NATIONAL JEWISH MONTHLY, printed in THE MEDIA
AND TERRORISM. supra note 19, at 28.2 5Letter from E. Diamond to the Editor, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, April 1977, at 13.
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vasive effect of broadcast violence is not the imitation of violence, but the
spreading of intimidation, of the fear of victimization. Terror can only suc-
ceed if the act is conveyed to the audience whose behavior the terrorists are
seeking to influence." The news media, by conveying this message of fear,
become accomplices of the terrorists, and directly responsible for the outcome
of the terrorist incident.24
Dr. David Hubbard, a psychiatrist with the Aberrant Behavior Center in
Dallas and a regular consultant to police authorities during hi-jackings and
terrorist incidents, believes that the lack of convincing evidence regarding the
contagion factor does not absolve newsmen. JHe told a convention of broad-
cast news executives last year that their industry has not learned to evaluate
itself and the "emotional power of its transmitters." While Americans live
under the twin threats of "nuclear destruction and electronic nihilism," the
nuclear power industry is much more aware of its destructive capability and
consequently has built in more safeguards to protect the public. "I suggest
newsmen have a serious conflict of interest which blinds the industry as to its
destructive impacts in moments of crisis coverage," Hubbard said. 25
The conflict of interest mentioned by Hubbard is that the reporter cover-
ing terrorist activity must decide whether his actions will be guided by the in-
terests of the hostages, public authorities and the community at large, or the
newsgathering and financial interests of his station or newspaper. These in-
terests rarely coincide. 26 The belief that the financial imperatives of news
organizations are served by turning terrorist incidents into "media events" is a
familiar theme. Charles Fenyvasi, a journalist who was taken hostage by the
Hanafis, reported that his fellow hostages grew to consider the news media as
"our enemy":
As hostages, many of us felt that the Hanafi takeover was a happening, a
guerrilla theater, a high impact propaganda exercise programmed for the TV
screen, and secondarily for the front pages of newspapers around the world....
Some say that the media was (sic) the enemy because it sensationalized our
ordeal, reproducing in color the blue of our bruises, the red of our blood,
playing up all that was absurd, displaying our fright and our tears.27
The compelling fascination of ongoing violence and the competitive
nature of the news industry lead frequently to journalistic overkill. In May
1977 a gunman attempted to rob a suburban Youngstown, Ohio, bank and
under police pursuit, fled into an apartment development where he took a
woman and two children as hostages. In the next twenty-six hours, news
2
4TV Newsman Split on Air Time for Terrorists, MORE, June, 1977, at 20.
25 RTNDA workshop recording, note 20, supra.
261n other areas, such as Watergate or Bert Lance. . . . the news media can smell conflict
of interest through multiple layers of official denial as well as through a White House stonewall.
These same newshawks, however, seem to be oblivious to the clear financial gain of a newspaper
or television station in the behavior of reporters at the crisis scene, Dr. Hubbard said. Id.2
'Fenyvasi, supra note 22, at 28.
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teams from three local television stations, a dozen radio stations, at least
twelve newspapers in northeastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania, television
stations in Cleveland, and all three commercial television networks converged
on the scene and transformed a small time gunman into a full-fledged ter-
rorist. The news director of one television station reported that his staff of
two photographers, three reporters and two anchormen supplied viewers with
regular bulletins, a special eighteen-minute report followed the capture of the
gunman, "exclusive" interviews with the gunman's father and sister, and films
of the gunman himself.
We camped, virtually on the terrorist's doorstep, throughout each tension-
filled moment of the unfolding drama. And we covered the story from every
conceivable angle without endangering the lives of those involved. . . .We
supplied our viewing audience with a steady stream of information concern-
ing developments and bulletined the escape of the hostages and the capture
of the terrorist well ahead of our competitors including all local radio sta-
tions. 28
It has been suggested, in contrast, that recent coverage of terrorism ex-
poses the need for a re-education in news values among the nation's jour-
nalists. While conceding that incidents such as the Hanafi assault demand
saturation news coverage, editors of the Columbia Journalism Review ques-
tioned the smothering coverage devoted to the Kiritsis incident and the Corey
Moore case in suburban Cleveland, Ohio. "By what standards-other than
fear of losing out to the competition and the inherent excitement of live pic-
tures of, say, a man in imminent danger of having his head blown off-do
such events qualify as significant in terms of the values supposedly cherished
by serious journalists?"2 9
Another criticism of journalistic coverage of terrorist incidents is that the
simple act of reporting ongoing activity often enlists journalists as actors in
the terrorists' drama. This was demonstrated in the recent Indianapolis case,
involving Anthony Kiritsis. Kiritsis's first demand was for immunity from pro-
secution from all charges growing out of the incident. Recognizing the im-
possibility of meeting this demand, law enforcement officials elected to
negotiate his other demands first, saving the promise of immunity for use
during a time of crisis. This crisis was reached sometime after 5 p.m. on
Wednesday, Feb. 9, when radio station WIBC broadcast this report:
Studio announcer: Touching base at Crestwood, scene of the action of
the hostage held: any possible change, Doug?
Reporter (Douglas O'Brien): Very much apparently, Lou. In the last 25
or 30 minutes, the situation has deteriorated some, due to what exactly we
2 Scott, Profile of Terror: How Medium Market TV Covered the Story, RTNDA COM-
MUNICATOR. July, 1977, at 4.2 Taking terror's measure, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 1977, at 6.
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don't know. Although there has been a good deal of yelling and screaming
going on over the telephone and through the door from Tony Kiritsis's third-
floor apartment ... Then he and the hostage, Richard Hall, began to argue
and that is not a healthy situation.
Announcer: That's a first, isn't it? Hall had been quoted earlier as say-
ing . . . that he was getting food, water and was reasonably well-treated.
Reporter: Ah . . . right. Now this argument has started; we don't know
what the result here will be. The Army bomb squad that's here has begun to
try and think of ways to somehow get in without setting off the explosives.
We're told ... (indistinct) . . . that they may be able to . . . if Kiritsis could
be incapacitated somehow, they could get in and defuse the explosives that
are in the room, if they are in fact there, and they do believe they are. (An-
nouncer: Okay.) They could get in without setting them off, if Kiritsis were
incapacitated.
Announcer: Okay, but it hasn't really come to that and we'll anxiously
await the next report from the scene . . .3
Kiritsis, who has his radio tuned to WIBC, interpreted this as meaning that
the bomb squad was rushing his apartment. 3' Witnesses reported that he
became extremely agitated, ordered his brother and a friend to leave a near-
by apartment, and angrily threatened to blow up Hall and himself. Officials
in the nearby command bus decided if the (false) immunity promise was go-
ing to be made, this was the time to do it.3
2
Incidents such as this, in which a straight news report influences directly
both the hostage-taker and the authorities' strategy in dealing with him, are
responsible for the sentiment among police officials that reporting of ongoing
terrorist incidents should be limited. Authorities argue that journalists intrude
upon these situations in the following respects: (1) by providing basic in-
telligence and tactical information for terrorists in their news reports, (2) by
creating traffic problems at the scene, (3) by tying up telephone lines with
terrorists while authorities are attempting to contact or negotiate with them,
(4) by diluting police authority by talking directly with the terrorists and rein-
forcing their sense of power, (5) by displacing the authorities from their
rightful role of acting as negotiators, (6) by nagging the police for informa-
tion when they are occupied with saving the hostages, and (7) by either
casting doubt on the veracity of the police or raising anxiety levels of the ter-
rorists by broadcasting or printing inaccurate or premature reports during the
incident.33
Many police officials believe that competition between newsmen, inspired
by their respective news organizations, lies at the root of media intrusions.
"A tape recording of the newscast was introduced as evidence into the Kiritsis trial. See
State v. Kiritsis, CR77-44A.
"He believed police, says man who held hostage, Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 18, 1977,
§ B, at 1, col. 1.
"Transcript of preliminary hearings, State v. Kiritsis, CR77-44A, at 00137.
"Speech by Cherif Bassiouni, professor of law, DePaul University, printed in THE ME IA
AND TERRORISM, supra note 19, at 8; Murphy, supra note 19, at 11-12.
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Capt. Frank Bolz, who heads the New York City police hostage team-and in
this capacity, has dealt with more than 80 hostage cases in the past five
years-describes it this way:
One of the big problems we have with the media is the "scoop." If one guy
happens to make a phone call to a perpetrator and gets an interview, all the
others feel, "We've been scooped by station WWWWI We'd better get in
there." And that's the wrong attitude. We would much prefer if the media
could just sit back and say, "Wait a minute, this is exactly what this guy
wants. Are we part of the theater involved in this?" Is the media going to be
part of the problem or is it going to be reporting what is taking place?
34
The common thread in these criticisms is a questioning of journalism's
role and purpose. Simply stated, whose side are the news media on? Whom
do reporters and editors represent, the interests -financial or otherwise-of
their news organizations, or those of the whole community? Is the public's
right to know, as promoted by news personnel, superior to other liberties: the
right to life of the hostages and police, the right of privacy of the hostages
and their families, the terrorists' right to a fair trial, or the right of the com-
munity to take what means are necessary to preserve itself?
Police and other public officials have a uniformly clear perception of
their own role in quelling a terrorist disturbance: to rescue the hostages, pro-
tect the general public, prevent the death or injury of police officers, and
save the lives of the terrorists, if possible.3 5 These objectives should be ac-
complished in a restrained, disciplined manner. Together, they represent an
ethic predicated upon the preservation of the community; anyone who in-
terferes or otherwise contributes to the terrorists' cause is perceived to be
violating this ethic. In this context, journalistic zeal, the differences between
reporters' purposes and those of the police, and the fragmented nature of the
news industry (would it be possible for police authorities to quell any distur-
bance if the city police, sheriffs department, state police, National Guard
and FBI were competing to see which agency could accomplish it first?) lead
the police to question the motives of the news media. Robert Rabe, deputy
police chief of Washington, D.C., says that he cannot trust journalists
because they, unlike the police, do not follow any guidelines in their work
that he can understand; their competitive sense prohibits responsibility. 6
Rabe says, therefore, that he would detain any journalist who was respon-
sible for the death of a hostage or police officer. Capt. Bolz of the New York
police hostage team, however, promotes a more restrained approach to the
press. Members of his team are trained to recognize the importance of keep-
"
4Crisis Cop Raps Media, MORE, June, 1977, at 19.35Speech by James Rochford, superintendent, Chicago Police Department, printed in THE
MEDIA AND TERRORISM. supra note 19, at 23.3
'Debate on coverage of terrorism comes up with few solutions, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR.
April, 1977, at p. 12.
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ing newsmen informed: ". . . we can't prevent press misbehavior . . . we can
only educate the media and hope they will acknowledge that when they do
something like that, they are risking the lives of the police and the
hostages. 3 7 Ultimately, the press and police will settle their differences as
they learn more about the terrorist threat. "Basically, we both have the same
job-to serve the public. You're there to inform the public and we're there to
protect the public. I think we're working side by side."38
This statement of cooperative spirit closely parallels the approach taken
by the federal Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism. Because an "adversary
relationship between the civil authority and the media can benefit none but
the terrorist," the press and police must cooperate when the community is
threatened by terrorist activity.3 9 Only through a frank and honest exchange
of views and information can the news media maintain confidence in the
authorities and the media retain their credibility with the public.
Two principles should govern all police contacts with the press, according
to the task force. First, the police should be as candid and complete in com-
municating information to the news media as law enforcement considerations
will allow. Second, the police should attempt to acquaint journalists with the
risks that might be associated with some forms of reporting.40
The federal task force also made a number of specific recommenda-
tions-many of which were adopted and promoted by others criticizing the
news media's performance in the coverage of terrorism-for improving
police/press relations in emergency situations. 41 Police agencies, for example,
should develop procedures to increase media access to accurate information
during emergencies. "Media .information centers" to regulate news flow
should be created, and rules prepared that would govern media access to the
scene of violent incidents. 42 Authorities also should organize regular forums
for the exchange of police and news media views on news coverage, police af-
57Crisis Cop Raps Media, note 34, supra.381d. at 21.
"
5 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 39.
"Id. at 236.41For example, Maurice J. Cullinane, the Washington, D.C. police chief, prepared this
package for consideration by that area's media representatives. At future terrorist incidents, a
"broadcast area" would be established near police lines from which bulletins and interviews could
be broadcast. A separate briefing area also would be set up for disseminating off-the-record in-
formation, with no cameras or recording devices permitted here. A police press secretary would
be available to give periodic briefings. In some cases, a media pool representative would be per-
mitted into negotiations so he might brief other reporters. Finally, a police hotline would be in-
stalled and updated continually during the incident.
In return, Cullinane asks that the news media: confine reports and broadcasts to facts that
the police have released regarding ongoing events; avoid telephoning hostage-takers; use only
long camera shots of the scene of the incident; avoid broadcasting or printing "how to" informa-
tion on the terrorists' activities, and if there is a bombing connected with the. terrorist incident,
avoid identifying the group claiming responsibility. Police, media and terrorism, Christian
Science Monitor, Dec. 5, 1977, at 46, col. 1.
"2See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, note 10, supra,.
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fairs and related issues, and these forums might consider the feasibility of
developing ground rules for the coverage of violence and terrorism. 43 Also,
authorities should encourage attempts by the news media to develop self-
regulating standards that would govern their reporting of terrorism.44
Though the task force was careful to avoid the appearance of specifying
how the news industry should operate in terrorist situations, it also suggested
that an "appropriate approach to news coverage" is summarized by the prin-
ciples of minimum intrusiveness and complete, noninflammatory coverage.45
That is, news organizations should avoid creating any greater presence, at the
scene than is necessary to collect full, accurate and balanced information.
And the news report that best serves the public omits no important details
and attempts to place these details in a context.
News organizations wanting to implement these principles might, accor-
ding to the task force, consider these specific proposals: (1) the use of "pool"
reporters to cover activities at the scene on behalf of all news organizations
and news agencies; (2) self-imposed restrictions on lighting, use of cameras
and other special newsgathering technologies; (3) the limitation of attempts to
solicit interviews with hostage-takers; (4) reliance upon officially designated
police spokesmen; (5) avoidance of inquiries to obtain tactical information
that would prejudice enforcement operations if disclosed; (6) delayed repor-
ting of details that might inflame or aggravate the situation; (7) avoidance, to
the extent possible, of coverage that emphasizes the sensational qualities of
the incident, and (8) balancing of news stories that incorporate self-serving
statements by terrorists with contrasting informiation from official sources. 46
The recommendations of the task force were based upon one important
assumption: that the news media will be responsible and cooperative in their
reporting of terrorism, even though it "may well be impossible for the profes-
sion to agree upon standards that might guide, if not govern, its members in
this difficult area of servicing the public," due to the "complexity and com-
peting interests of that vast, diverse, and vitally important part of the private
sector. 47
Charles Fenyvasi, the Washington journalist who was a hostage of the
Hanafis, possesses an occupational distaste for everything resembling govern-
mental regulation. But he also believes that the news media must agree upon
one principle: "that concern for life should be absolute and that the public's
right to know need not be absolute." 48 Fenyvasi proposes that a committee of
editors in any city experiencing a terrorist incident should be empowered to
declare and enforce a "news media emergency" under which certain rules of
43id.
4"Id.
"Id. at 387-90.
46See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, note 10, supra.
41Id. at 66.
4'Fenyvasi, note 22, at 30.
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the profession would be suspended. For instance, instead of aggressively
gathering news and scooping competition, protecting or at least not en-
dangering lives should be the top priority. Anyone who violates this rule
should be held accountable and be subject to disciplinary action by his
employer.
In Tolkien's great epic fantasy, the war is over a magic ring that renders
its wearer invisible. In our century of science fiction, the news media is
capable of providing total global visibility, and newsmen have a special
responsibility in adjusting to the fact that we live in an age in which every
man with a gun, and particularly a band of determined men with guns or
explosives, can be a super power. 49
THE MEDIA'S RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF ITS COVERAGE OF TERRORISM
The news media's defense is predicated upon a seemingly devout
adherence to classical libertarian values. 50 The public's right to know is best
served, news industry spokesmen argue, by the preservation of the American
free speech tradition. Individual journalists must remain unshackled so they
might exercise their reason and fulfill the sacred trust implicit in the First
Amendment. Moreover, their reporting informs the public of the terrorist
threat and contributes to the free play of ideas by airing the terrorists'
grievances. Only when safeguarded by these protections will the democratic
community act with reflection, wisdom, and justice.
These libertarian principles, born in seventeenth century Europe and in
the American colonial experience, also contain an unmistakable anti-
governmental sentiment; liberty is equated with the absence of authoritarian
regulation and interference. The modern news media, the argument goes,
must avoid entangling alliances with civil authorities-such as becoming in-
volved in prior agreements with police agencies-and remain the public's
trusted watchdog, an omnipresent check upon the inevitable excesses of
government.
These themes are both familiar and self-serving. They are advanced by
industry spokesmen whenever the value of the press's first amendment protec-
tion is measured against other fundamental liberties or in periods of sustained
press criticism, such as that which followed the urban disorders of the 1960's.
Anthony Lewis of the New York Times has noted that some journalists
believe that press freedom is an absolute value and must always prevail when
it is in conflict with other constitutional values, such as those of privacy, good
name, fair trial, and respect for law. "That posture tends to confirm the
widespread public impression that publishers and broadcasters and journalists
4 9
1d.
5OSee Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, U. PA.
L. REv. 737 (1977).
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generally are a self-concerned lot, free with attacks on others but highly sen-
sitive to criticism themselves-in short, guilty of the same fault that they so
often find in others: abuse of power."51
Some media spokesmen argue that the libertarian tradition has served
both the country and American journalism well, and should not be abandon-
ed in face of the terrorist irruption. What is needed, they argue, is a more
skillful and professional journalism. Others, however, respond that the liber-
tarian tradition can be preserved only by the adoption of flexible guidelines
and policy statements by the news industry that might prevent the worst ex-
cesses of terrorism coverage. What few have questioned is the contemporary
utility of the libertarian tradition itself.
Free and unrestrained communication is more than an abstract virtue; it
is the essence of the liberal community and to inhibit news coverage as a
strategy in controlling terrorism endangers this tradition. When news
organizations are restrained, even on a voluntary basis, "aren't we in effect
surrendering freedom and allowing terrorists to win?" 52 Restrictive measures
applied in response to attacks on liberty can be turned upon politically accep-
table forms of communication as well. Guidelines that determine "proper"
forms of news coverage really
can be applied and misapplied to genuine grievances that prompt protest
marches, that prompt demonstrations, that lead to acts of civil disobedience
as we observed in the '60's. It is only a tiny step from saying that we cannot
cover this aspect of terrorism, to we cannot cover and should not cover that
type of civil disobedience. 53
Unrestrained communication during periods of violence has practical ad-
vantages as well. As the New York Times replied to Ambassador Andrew
Young's suggestion that terrorism coverage may require that the first amend-
ment be "clarified," to deny terrorists the news coverage they desire might
lead them in "more chilling directions." 54 The lesson from the urban
disorders, the Times said, is that rumors of violence are often worse than the
truth itself. Where newsmen honored police requests to withhold information
about disturbances, local rumor-mills exaggerated them into civil wars in the
public mind. s5 Leonard Downie Jr., assistant managing editor of the
Washington Post, believes that the saturation coverage given the Hanafi inci-
dent helped keep the city at ease. "I think that the saturation coverage allow-
ed the city to relax, in a way, to know that information was coming to them,
5 Lewis, "Cantankerous, Obstinate, Ubiquitous": The Press, NIEMAN REPORTS, Spring,
1976, at 3, 7.
52Speech by Ralph Otwell, editor of the Chicago Sun-Times, printed in THE MEDIA AND
TERRORISM, supra note 19, at 24.
531d.
5 Terrorism and Fit News, N.Y. Times, March 15, 1977, at 36, col. 1.
55TV Newsmen Split on Air Times for Terrorists, MORE, June, 1977, at 20.
1978]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
that they knew what was going on: they did not have to be panicky, they
didn't have to depart from normal that much . . ."56
These virtues are closely linked with the concept of the "free market of
ideas" in the news media's defense. It is not journalism's job, newsmen argue,
to prevent violence or determine the validity of grievances; journalists merely
report information, meeting their obligation to the people's right to know, so
the citizens may determine for themselves the truth or falsity of claims and
counter-claims. Diversity of messages and competition between newsmen ac-
tually serves the public, not the terrorist.
Richard Salant, president of CBS News, concedes that broadcast coverage
may encourage terrorists, but explains that in the news industry
in news we are in the business of giving ideas. We present facts from which
people draw their own conclusions on, whether it's politics or terrorists or
anything else-people draw ideas from them. If we start playing God and say
that fact or this viewpoint. . . .might give people ideas, we would have to
stop covering politics, covering practically anything but volcano eruptions
and natural disasters.... I'm not about to play the idea of God and decide
which ideas are good and which ideas are bad."7
Salant's compatriots in the broadcasting industry enlarge upon this ra-
tionale. William Sheehan, then president of ABC News, argued that televi-
sion's right to report terrorism is absolute, and it aims to provide viewers with
complete information: "I don't think it's our job to decide what people should
not know."' 8 William Small, senior vice president of CBS News, responds that
"it's always better to report than not report."5 9 And then suggesting that ter-
rorism might be an access question, Small adds: ". . .people with a grievance
have a right to get their story told. We shouldn't be suppressing speech any
more than we should allow others to suppress our reporting. 60
Ultimately it is the credibility of the news media that is at stake. The free
market will not function, and the public's right to know cannot be met if
readers and viewers lose faith in their suppliers of news. Cooperative ar-
rangements with police authorities to withhold news, or judgments made
within news organizations to report only a partial story, could be injurious
not only to the audience, but to the American system itself, according to
Small:
The worst thing that could happen in this country-far worse than any
act of terrorism-would be a loss of faith in the news reporting of television
56Speech by Leonard Downie, Jr., printed in THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM, supra note 19, at
22.
"Richard Salant, RTNDA workshop recording, note 20, supra.5
"Hickey, Terrorism and television: the medium in the middle, TV GuIDE. Aug. 7, 1976, at
12.
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and newspapers. We're not educators, we're not sociologists. Our role re-
mains that of reporters-to give people as much information as we can, as
straight as possible and with as little hysteria as possible. 6'
Although the high costs of publishing and broadcasting, and increasing
tendencies toward monopoly, group-ownership and cross-media control of
communications outlets would seem to have restricted sharply the "free
market" of ideas, many journalists cling to the romantic notion that
unrestrained competition and diversity of news outlets are what characterize
the American communications system. 62 The need to preserve this pluralist
tradition is used, accordingly, as a justification for opposing suggestions that
the news media might adopt a different approach toward the coverage of ter-
rorism. A.M. Rosenthal, executive editor of the New York Times, describes
himself as "viscerally against" attempts to establish guidelines governing ter-
rorism coverage: "I don't want guidelines from the government and I don't
want any from professional organizations or anyone else. The strength of the
press is its diversity. As soon as you start imposing guidelines, they become
peer-group pressures and then quasi-legal restrictions. '63 The vice president
of the Radio Television News Directors Association concurs: "Competition
provides most of the benefits of our system . . 64
It is the perception, regardless of whether diversity and competition truly
are hallmarks of the American news industry or merely romantic illusion,
that makes journalists feel misunderstood, especially by critics who suggest,
for example, that three reporters representing a news "pool" might cover an
ongoing terrorist incident with more restraint than fifty journalists from com-
peting news organizations. Richard Salant of CBS News points out that pool-
ing arrangements are time-consuming to establish, raise questions about
which news organizations will be invited or permitted into the pool, and im-
ply that news editors will be inclined to delegate responsibility for sensitive
coverage to reporters whom they do not know. Also, he questions whether ter-
rorists would be placated by dealing with a single reporter representing many
news organizations when they expected to receive the attentions of a battery
of radio and television stations, newspapers and wire services. 65 Sun-Times
editor Otwell concludes that proposals for news pools, voluntary guidelines or
controlled information channeled through police command posts all share "a
single irrational and unworkable premise": that the media all will do the
511d.62For a recent discussion of changes in the economic structure of the news media, see D.
McDonald, The Media's Conflict of Interest, THE CENTER MAGAZINE November/December, 1976,
at 15-35.6 Shaw, Editors Face Terrorist Demand Dilemma, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15, 1976, at
14, col. 1.6 Schultz, Censorship is no solution to coverage of terroristshostage situations, RTNDA
COMMUNICATOR, July, 1977, at 7.
"Salant, note 57, supra.
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same thing-or not do the same thing--at the same time. "If it were possible
to round up all journalists and march them in lockstep to the same or-
chestrated beat, we could end certainly a lot of abuses and excesses by the
media. But it also would be the funeral dirge for the free press as we have
known it... "66
Otwell's remark expresses the distrust of authority implicit in the liber-
tarian tradition. Newsmen who routinely see themselves in an adversarial
position in normal times find it difficult to cooperate with public authorities
under extraordinary circumstances. The seriousness with which some
newsmen view this watchdog role was demonstrated by some replies MORE
magazine obtained in a poll of television news directors regarding their at-
titudes toward terrorism coverage:
If the media doesn't play an adversary role, the police might take justice
further than they should. When we're covering a hostage story, police
violence is not our first concern at the height of it, but it is one of the other
elements. When the police say, "We don't want you guys around," my first
thought is, "What are they going to be doing in there?" (Lou Rothbart,
KTLA-TV, Los Angeles)
I'm not awed by the police. Cops have made lots of wrong decisions.
Judges and cops are no more qualified to make decisions as to what we
should cover than any other human being. We should reserve the right to
make our own decisions. (Gene Strul, WCKT-TV, Miami) 7
Journalists and news organizations which cooperate with public
authorities sometimes encounter censure and criticism from colleagues in the
journalism fraternity. During the Kiritsis siege, broadcast outlets not only
provided the hostage-taker with a half hour of airtime, but also broadcast a
public apology from the hostage's mortgage firm and reported the immunity
offer without challenge or interpretation. In the words of one local television
news executive, "The media more than covered the story: they were part of it
" . .,,68 To another, this spirit of cooperation amounted to an outright sur-
render: "The Indianapolis media surrendered its (sic) independence by basing
news reports on a police request that we not report anything that would upset
the kidnapper. We became part of a police effort to fool a kidnapper instead
of being an independent by-stander there to inform the public.
69
Near the center of the Kiritsis melodrama was another newsman, Fred
Heckman. Heckman, news director of radio station WIBC and a familiar
local radio personality, was telephoned by Anthony Kiritsis after he had taken
Richard Hall hostage. Kiritsis complained about reports on television and
6 Address by Ralph Otwell, National Convention of the Society of Professional Journalists
(November, 1977) (audio tape recording on deposit in the Indiana University School of Jour-
nalism Library).
67TV Newsmen Split on Air Time for Terrorists, MORE, June, 1977, at 20.
18Bob Gamble (WRTV, Indianapolis), RTNDA workshop recording, note 20, supra.
"Letter from S. Yount to the Editor, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, April, 1977, at 13.
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Heckman offered the opportunity to tell his side of the story. Their conversa-
tion was taped and a substantial segment was broadcast. Thus began a series
of telephone communications between the two, part of which were later
broadcast on WIBC, and Heckman found himself becoming a mediator.
"What this did was set up a trust that eventually was credited as a major part
in saving not only Dick Hall's life but that of Kiritsis."70 Heckman's critics say
that he provided the kidnapper with a platform and thereby contributed to
the creation of Kiritsis's "folk hero" image, making him sound like a
frustrated man who had been swindled by his mortgage firm. Heckman con-
cedes that there might be some truth to the charge, but says that under the
circumstances, he had no choice.
I didn't like it. There was a twenty-year development of credibility and in-
tegrity in the Indianapolis market that I had on the line and quite obviously
some of it was lost. Yes, it did make Kiritsis a folk hero . . . To a great ex-
tent I was probably the one responsible for that and I didn't like it, but (I)
felt that there was no other way, no other course to take . . .7
One of Heckman's critics, Steven Yount (director of news and public af-
fairs, WIRE-AM/WXTZ-FM, Indianapolis), claims that whatever the cir-
cumstances, journalists should not abandon their traditional role and become
attached emotionally or compassionately to either police or hostage-takers.
"Reporters are trained to serve as uninvolved observers. It's our responsibility
in my opinion to gather and report the facts." Yount concedes that this might
endanger the hostages or anger the police. "But it always serves the public
and that's our job. . . first, last and always to serve the public by reporting
the truth."7 2
This idealistic commitment to objectivity and libertarian values is a major
factor in journalism's response to the suggested implementation of voluntary
reporting guidelines. There is general agreement that such guidelines cannot
sanction news blackouts on the grounds that news of terrorist incidents might
be contagious. As the National News Council said in its statements on ter-
rorism, blackouts would raise both doubts over what the news media have
withheld and their motives for doing this, as well as questions about what
other types of news might have been withheld, ostensibly in the public in-
terest. In addition, the Council argued that there are "greater possible risks
involved in wild and reckless rumors and exaggerated provocative word-of-
mouth reports" than in reporting facts. 7
"Fred Heckman, RTNDA workshop recording, note 20, supra.
711d.
"Remarks of Steven Yount during panel discussion at National Convention of the Society
of Professional Journalists (November, 1977) (audio tape on deposit at the Indiana University
School of Journalism Library).
73Statement on Terrorism and the Media, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 1977, at 81.
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There also is industry-wide agreement that uniform guidelines cannot be
applied to all news organizations without changing the nature of American
journalism itself. The free press concept implies competition between both
contributors and ideas, and accordingly contributors must not agree in ad-
vance as to what sorts of messages will or will not be publicized. Equally, the
guidelines should be constructed by journalists and not public officials so they
will not become too restrictive. "If you give a cop the opportunity to say yes
or no, he'll always say no," is the way a CBS News executive described the
response by the network's newsmen to the suggestion from CBS management
personnel that police officials should be consulted in preparing guidelines. 74
There is also a general fear within the industry that even voluntary statements
will somehow become mandatory, requiring conformity to some explicit stan-
dard. ". . . the problem is that guidelines, regulations, immediately stimulate
the very appropriate press response, 'You're threatening a very great value in
this country.' And words like regulation and guidelines start sounding like
government control."' 5
Nonetheless, some major American newsgathering organizations recently
adopted guidelines in response to the terrorist threat: CBS News, NBC News,
United Press International, the Associated Press, the Louisville Courier-
Journal and Times, and the Chicago Sun-Times and Daily News, among
others. The CBS guidelines, incorporated in April 1977 into the CBS News
Standards, begin by stating that the network's news staff will continue to app-
ly "the normal tests of news judgment" to terrorism cases, and if the stories
are considered newsworthy, they will be covered in spite of the dangers of
contagion. Their reporting, however, requires "thoughtful, conscientious care
and restraint. Obviously, the story should not be sensationalized beyond the
actual fact of its being sensational. '7 6
74Speech by William Small, printed in THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM. supra note 19, at 16.
76Norval Morris, as quoted in id. at 34.
"
8These are the specific guidelines developed by CBS News:
(1) An essential component of the story is the demand of the terrorist/kidnapper
and we must report these demands. But we should avoid providing an excessive plat-
form for the terrorist/kidnapper. Thus, unless such demands are succinctly stated and
free of rhetoric and propaganda, it may be better to paraphrase the demands instead
of presenting them directly through the voice or picture of the terrorist/kidnapper.
(2) Except in the most compelling circumstances, and then only with the approval
of the President of CBS News, or in his absence, the Senior Vice President of News,
there should be no live coverage of the terrorist/kidnapper since we may fall into the
trap of providing an unedited platform for him. (This does not limit live on-the-spot
reporting by CBS News reporters, but care should be exercised to assure restraint and
context).
(3) News personnel should be mindful of the probable need by the authorities
who are dealing with the terrorist for communication by telephone and hence should
endeavor to ascertain, wherever feasible, whether our own use of such lines would be
likely to interfere with the authorities' communications.
(4) Responsible CBS News representatives should endeavor to contact experts
dealing with the hostage situation to determine whether they have any guidance on
such questions as phraseology to be avoided, what kinds of questions or reports might
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The CBS News guidelines seem to have served as models for those pro-
duced by other news organizations; they are remarkably similar and together
share a number of characteristics. First, they suggest that their reporters will
make efforts to avoid becoming participants in terrorist situations: "We will
make every effort not to become participants in the event. We will resist be-
ing used by the terrorists to provide a platform for their propaganda"7 7 and
"We will not become part of the story." 78 However, none of the guidelines is
specific on this point; not one, for example, states that reporters will not in-
terview terrorists during ongoing incidents, or will not telephone them, or
that reported material will be restricted to that released by the police. Nor do
the guidelines address the point made by the news media's critics: that the
mere act of reporting an ongoing incident draws reporters into the drama
and makes participants of them.
Most guidelines attempt to provide senior news executives with greater
control over their organization's coverage: "The senior supervisory editor
should determine what-if any-information should be withheld or deferred
after consultation with reporters and appropriate authorities"79 and "We will
assign experienced staff members to the story. We will involve the papers' top
news officials when making decisions."80 This detail is of some sociological
significance, for it indicates that in spite of frequent references by news in-
dustry executives to the professional integrity and independence of their news
employees, within their own organizations there is recognition of the need to
centralize authority for these decisions in senior management personnel. This
recognition was illustrated by the actions of 'the Associated Press in releasing
the story on the false immunity offer to Anthony Kiritsis. The decision to
move the story was made not in Indianapolis by reporters and editors close to
the situation, but seven hundred miles away by the AP's managing editor in
tend to exacerbate the situations, etc. Any such recommendations by established
authorities on the scene should be carefully considered as guidance (but not as instruc-
tions) by CBS News personnel.
(5) Local authorities should also be given the name or names of CBS personnel
whom they can contact should they have further guidance or wish to deal with such
delicate questions as a newsman's call to the terrorists or other matters which might in-
terfere with authorities dealing with the terrorists.
(6) Guidelines affecting our coverage of civil disturbances are also applicable
here, especially those which relate to avoiding the use of inflammatory catchwords or
phrases, the reporting of rumors, etc. As in the case of policy dealing with civil distur-
bances, in dealing with a hostage story reporters should obey all police instructions but
report immediately to their superiors any such instructions that seem to be intended to
manage or suppress the news.
(7) Coverage of this kind of story should be in such overall balance as to length,
that it does not unduly crowd out other important news of the hour/day.
Copies of news organizations guidelines mentioned in this article are on deposit in the Indiana
University School of Journalism Library.
77Id. (Louisville Courier-Journal and Times).
'Ord. (UPI).
Ird. (Chicago Sun-Times and Daily News).
901d. (Louisville Courier-Journal and Times).
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New York City. This was "because no one here (in Indianapolis) wanted to
take responsibility involving two lives. 81
The guidelines all propose that traditional journalistic practices should be
applied in reporting terrorism: stories should be accurate, reported fully,
avoid sensationalism, maintain a sense of balance. As the UPI guidelines
summarize the agency's approach: "In all cases we will apply the rule of com-
mon sense." What is unexplained is why these reminders of the basic ap-
proach of good journalism are needed at all. As one commentator remarked:
"All of which perhaps leaves the profession with an embarrassing question:
Shouldn't journalists ask themselves how those basics sometimes get shoved
aside, ignored or forgotten when they're most necessary?"8 2
The guidelines also suggest a reluctance on the part of news organizations
to consider forthrightly moral questions surrounding journalism's role and
purpose in the community, and its relations with those who violate the com-
munity's laws and those who uphold them. Instead, the guidelines suggest
that a pragmatic approach is appropriate because no two terrorist situations
are the same: "There can be no clearly defined policy for terrorist and kid-
napping stories. The circumstances vary in each case."8 13 The implication is
that instead of broad ethical statements of purpose, "situation ethics" apply.
A CBS News executive described his network's guidelines as sensible, flexible
and subject to amendment: "So we can, as we have, change our guidelines as
we go along." 84
While these guidelines seem to represent sincere attempts on the part of
the news organizations to do something rarely attempted in the news in-
dustry- to make reporting conventions explicit and concrete-these standards
offer little moral assistance to journalists reporting an issue that is replete
with moral dilemmas. The pragmatic approach bears a fatalistic element as
well, based upon the assumption that journalistic practice cannot be changed
without damaging the virtue of journalism itself. As one industry leader said
after rejecting critics' proposals to improve journalism's handling of the ter-
rorism story: " . . . the causes of these incidents will not be found in radio
and TV news and neither will the solutions. All we can hope to do -is not
make them any worse than they have to be."8 5
TERRORISM AND THE ECLIPSE OF LIBERTARIANISM
It may be argued that the extraordinary occurrence of a terrorist incident
may not provide the optimal environment for the study of journalistic ethics.
"
1Darrell Christian, Bloomington panel, note 1, supra.
8 2Czerniejewski, Guidelines For the Coverage of Terrorism, QUILL, July/August, 1977, at
23.
83UPI guidelines, note 76, supra.84Small, supra note 74, at 16.
"Schultz, Censorship is no solution to coverage of terrorist-hostage situations, RTNDA
COMMUNICATOR, July, 1977, at 7.
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It is true that the event's unexpected but directed nature, its bizarre twists
and embellishments, its undisguised plays for publicity-not only be ter-
rorists, but also be police officials, politicians, psychiatrists and journalists
themselves- all tend to exaggerate both the prominence of the event and the
behavior of its actors, but leave the significance of the event shrouded in am-
biguity. Perhaps journalistic ethics might better be studied in more ordered
environments, examining routine reporting and editing practices and the
moral decision-making involved in producing more conventional news stories.
But the example of terrorism is instructive as well, for it demonstrates the
lack of congruence between the libertarian tradition, which evolved long
before the technological and institutional development of the mass media,
and contemporary pressures upon the press. The theme being advanced here
is that libertarianism in large part lacks a moral code or philosophy. As it has
become linked with an objective ideal in journalism, it tolerates a lack of con-
cern with values and moral judgments and promotes instead a moral neutrali-
ty. For journalists thrust by the exigencies of a terrorist event into the position
of having to make moral decisions involving life and death, moral neutrality
provides an insufficient basis for making these decisions.
This is not to say that journalists are immoral or unethical or nihilistic as
an occupational condition. There seems to be little reason to suspect that
reporters and editors are less concerned with the morality of their actions
than lawyers, doctors, teachers, government officials or any other occupa-
tional group. But libertarianism and objectivity discourage moral considera-
tion of journalism's basic interests and identifications and in this vacuum,
other pressures of an economic and organizational nature often prove more
persuasive in determining the style of journalism that results.8 6
The news media's individualistic spirit and fundamental antagonism
toward authority are the romantic legacies of another day-the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth century. Later, in a period of rapid in-
dustrialization in the nineteenth century, this tradition was mated with a
"fetish for objective reporting." James W. Carey has pointed out that this
drive for objectivity carried a purely commercial motive: the mass newspaper
had to serve politically heterogeneous audiences without alienating any
significant segments of the audience. Objectivity grew into a canon of profes-
sional competence and developed an ideology of professional responsibility,
resting upon the "dubious assumption that the highest standard of profes-
sional performance occurred when the reporter presented the reader with all
sides of an issue (though there were usually only two), presented all the
'facts,' and allowed the reader to decide what these facts meant."87
"
6Some claim, for example, that the commercial basis of the news industry overrides its
democratic considerations. See R. Williams, COMMUNIcATIONS 118-23 (2d ed. 1966).87Carey, The Communications Revolution and the Professional Communicator, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF MASS MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, 32-33 (Sociological Review Monograph No. 13,
1969).
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Since the late 1940s, it has been argued that the specific conditions that
spawned the libertarian tradition and objectivity in journalism have changed,
and journalism must remodel itself accordingly. Carey, for example, regards
the concept of objective reporting as outmoded:
What are lamely called the conventions of objective reporting were
developed to report another century and another society. They were designed
to report a secure world of politics, culture, social relations, and international
alignments about which there was a rather broad consensus concerning
values, purposes, and loyalties.... That is, one can be content with "giving
the facts" where there are generally accepted rules for interpreting the facts
and an agreed set of political values and purposes. Today no accepted system
or interpretation exists and political values and purposes are very much in
contention."
The major proposal for reform has been more of a suggestion that the news
media in a democratic society possess a responsibility to present a meaningful
account of the day's events, with more background, interpretation, analysis
and context provided to help the citizen make sense of trends, events and
discoveries. 89 The press, public, and government together should make efforts
to keep the channels of communication open and restore competition of ideas
to the shrinking marketplace. While the rhetoric promoting a "social respon-
sibility" to the community has proven persuasive to many in journalism, 0 it
may be argued that the practice of reporting has changed very little; the
libertarian tradition still predominates, as the news media's defense of ter-
rorism coverage demonstrates.
This has a number of implications for the ethical problem involved in
reporting terrorism. First, the coverage of terrorism requires that moral
judgments be made, and the libertarian tradition as it has been understood
by journalists militates against judgments of any kind. Outwardly, the news
media attempt to collect all information available and relay it to their au-
diences as swiftly as possible, without bias, embellishment, or fear of the con-
sequences-for either the journalist or the audience-of publishing the news.
As a widely used reporting textbook advises, the effect of publishing the news
is not the reporter's concern: "He does not ask himself what the potential use
or effect of his information will be or how many 'gatekeepers' will handle it;
rather, his sole duty is to concentrate on discovering the truth."9 1
"Id. at 55.
"For the two major statements on the social repsonsibility of the press, see COMMISSION ON
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (1947) and F. Siebert, T. Peterson & W.
Schramn, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS (1956).
"Recent years have seen the formation of a national news council and a few regional or
local press councils, the appointment of news ombudsmen by many newspapers and broadcast
stations, more self criticism in the press and in professional reviews and journals, and a renewed
interest in ethical codes for various branches of journalism. For a description of how working
journalists respond to the social responsibility suggestion, see Chapter Seven, in J. Johnstone, E.
Slawski & W. Bowman, THE NEws PEOPLE 113 (1976).
21C. MacDougall, INTERPRETATIVE REPORTING 11 (7th ed. 1977).
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This non-judgmental posture extends to the news media's definition of
terrorism itself. Ralph Otwell, editor of the Chicago Sun-Times, was asked
last year if the press should not make a distinction between a terrorist act
(such as the Hanafi incident) and civil disobedience (such as a civil rights
march, which is likely to be more passive, non-violent and morally less offen-
sive in nature), and cover the respective events with this distinction in mind.
Otwell replied: "But once we start making judgments of this sort- as to what
constitutes terrorism-and what it an outgrowth of genuine grievances requir-
ing the widest possible dissemination, I think the media is [sic] going too far
and doing something far different from its basic role of simply informing.
'92
This reluctance to apply standards of judgments is what Dennis Chase
refers to as journalism's "aphilosophical attitude": as unwillingness to consider
crucial philosophical questions relating to journalists' functions and purposes
in the democratic order, and definitions of such fundamental concepts as
"news" itself.93 The lasting significance of the event is not recognized as a
matter of concern to the journalist; his job is to report the facts. How else
can one explain the selection of the Kiritsis melodrama as the second
(Associated Press) or third (United Press International) "most significant and
interesting Indiana news story of the year" by Indiana daily newspaper
editors?9' Because of this aphilosophical attitude, Chase argues, journalists
fall prey to pragmatism, subjectivism or whatever else is current in the society
at the moment. Invariably, this means that "situation ethics" will dominate;
instinct substitutes for analysis, and a curious nihilism results. This nihilism
lies at the base of criticism of the media's reporting of terrorism, according to
Peter Harland, a British journalist:
The question for the media is: Can we afford to stand back in an at-
tempt to be disinterested, in the best sense? Or should we allow ourselves to
be used, as in authoritarian countries, in the interests of a cause? Can the
press identify with values?
The trouble with high values is that you cannot defend them if you do
not already possess them. 95
However, this argument, as well as the news media's defense, obscures the
fact that news coverage is not determined solely by philosophical principles,
but also is influenced by economic and organizational constraints internal to
the news industry on one level, and the specific news agency on the other.
These constraints often work in opposition to the libertarian tradition. At a
simplified level, in individual reporter who might refrain from covering a
particular story in a terrorist situation for ethical reasons will recognize that
"Remarks of Ralph Otwell, during panel discussion, note 72, supra.
"3Chase, The Aphilosophy of Journalism, QUILL. September, 1971, at 15-17.
"Indiana '77: a year of cold and crime, Bloomington (Indiana) Sunday Herald-Times, Jan.
1, 1978, at 37, col. 1.
"51PI REPORT, November, 1977, at 7.
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rewards and sanctions within his orgnaization are determined more by staf-
fers' conformity, or non-conformity, to newsroom policies than philosophical
principles. In network news departments, "it is usually not necessary to con-
trol newsmen through tight editorial and writing supervision: the networks'
policies of recruitment and advancement assure that only newsmen that give
precedence to organizational over personal values will succeed in network
news." 96 For the most part, this is not a coercive process. Sociologist Warren
Breen found in a study of newspaper staffers that they conform to newsroom
policy on certain stories not so much out of a fear of sanctions, such as being
fired, but in response to subtle factors of a positive nature that encourage
conformity: the socialization process of the newsroom, the newsmen's mobility
aspirations, and their esteem for their superiors in the organization, among
others.9
7
A consequence is that emphasis is placed upon producing news, a collec-
tivized, institutional activity that also happens to be highly enjoyable. De-
fiance of newsroom policy for individualistic or ethical reasons often is
sacrificed by the journalist himself, and this influences his ethical potential:
A consequence of this focus on news as a central value is the shelving of
a strong interest in objectivity at the point of policy conflict. Instead of
mobilizing their efforts to establish objectivity over policy as the criterion for
performance, their energies are channelled into getting more news ...
Newsmen do talk about ethics, objectivity, and the relative worth of various
papers, but not when there is news to get. . . . They are not rewarded for
analyzing the social structure, but for getting news. It would seem that this
instrumental orientation diminishes their moral potential.9 8
This process of producing news necessarily involves complex judgments
regarding the selection and presentation of material- notwithstanding the
protestations of news industry spokesmen to the contrary. These judgments
also involve journalists as active agents in the manufacture of news-not as
passive recipients waiting patiently in newsrooms for events to occur. 99 When
faced with unexpected and unfamiliar events, journalists apply pre-existing
categories to make sense of them and make them consonant with what has
gone before. The essence of this selection, or editing, process is to link events,
looking for points of correspondence and local, national and international
significance in these events. Epstein notes, for example, how network news ex-
ecutives "tended to view most happenings not as isolated incidents, but as
threads of more general themes in the fabric of society as a whole. A
dramatic event, though limited in time and location, is thus commonly
96E. Epstein, BEWEEN FACT AND FICTION: THE PROBLEM OF JOURNALISM 201 (1975).
"Breed, Social Control in the News Room in JOURNALISM. 64-67 (A. Kirschner & L.
Kirschner eds.) (1971).
"Id. at 67.
99S. Cohen & J. Young, TsE MANUFACTURE OF NEws 18 (1973).
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presumed to be an indicator of a national trend or illustration of a national
malaise."' 00 In this way terrorism in West Germany or Washington becomes
terrorism in Indianapolis or Fernwood, Ohio. Though there would seem to be
vast differences in the magnitude of the threat posed to the social order by,
say, the Baader-Meinhof or Red Brigade style of terrorism in Europe, the
Hanafis in Washington, and Tony Kiritsis, these differences become blurred
and indistinct because coverage of these events is the product of organiza-
tional values primarily, and not social or ethical imperatives.
The significance is that recent terrorism in America has not been aimed
directly at the community and its values. But the question must be posed as
to how the news media will react if the next wave of terrorism resembles the
European or South American styles, with their more explicit political con-
notations. The problem lies in journalism's moral neutrality posture, which
prohibits the development of an ethic oriented toward the maintenance of the
community, its standards, values and culture. Traditions that prescribe an in-
flexible "watchdog" role for the press, or emphasize the publication of ter-
rorist rhetoric when the community itself feels intimidated, appear self-
defeating. Clearly judgments must be made by journalists that differentiate
between the wars of ideas fought within the legitimated institutions of the
community, and struggles fought outside these institutions and which rely
upon violence rather than verbiage, intimidation instead of intellect. As one
journalist argues: "When hate propagandists and apostles of violence attack
the democratic body politick, the journalist must be more than a passive
channel of communication. He has got to be a crusader for a climate of
reason in which ordered liberty and due process can work."' 01
The irony is that journalistic traditions that lead to an exaggeration of
terrorism's significance, and suggest an incongruence between the news
media's interests and those of other elements of the community, play into the
hands of those who see terrorism as a suitable cause for restricting the news
media's liberties. Indiscrete handling of the terrorist story contributes to a
climate of fear, as the federal Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism noted,
and this could lead to increased pressure upon the press:
There are other important reasons for insisting upon definitional clarity.
Terrorism is an attention-getting word. Casual or imprecise use of the term
engenders a climate of fear and uncertainty that can spread further afield
through the popular media. Eventually, a mystique is build up that allows for
a reduction of actual violence while fear itself is increased, and the mere
threat suffices to achieve the terroristic objective .... In this way, the notion
of terrorism is propagated, the fear of victimization increases in the com-
munity, and a false dimension of the problem is created. 1'0
00E. Epstein, NEws FROM NOwHERE: TELEvIsION AND THE NEws 228 (1973).
"0'Methvin, Objectivity and the Tactics of Terrorists, in ETHics AND THE PRESS: READINGS IN
MASS MEDIA MORALITY. 201 (J. Merrill & R. Barney eds. 1975).
102REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE. supra note 10, at 4.
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The conclusion is paradoxical. News media coverage of terrorism suggests
a moral, not a legal question. But the greater the collaboration between jour-
nalists and terrorists, the greater will grow community fears and calls for
legal restraints that will intrude upon what journalists regard as their liber-
tarian tradition. Only be forsaking this tradition, in developing a new ethical
posture that will voluntarily control and intellectually regulate the instrumen-
tality, can journalism preserve itself.
